Processing mode causally influences emotional reactivity: distinct effects of abstract versus concrete construal on emotional response. by Moberly, Nicholas J. et al.
  Processing Mode and Emotional Reactivity  1 
PROCESSING MODE AND EMOTIONAL REACTIVITY 
 
 
Processing mode causally influences emotional reactivity: Distinct effects of abstract versus concrete 
construal on emotional response 
 
 
Watkins, E.R., Moberly, N.J., & Moulds, M. (in press) Emotion
  Processing Mode and Emotional Reactivity  2 
Abstract 
Three studies are reported showing that emotional responses to stress can be modified by systematic prior 
practice in adopting particular processing modes. Participants were induced to think about positive and 
negative scenarios in a mode either characteristic of or inconsistent with the abstract-evaluative mindset 
observed in depressive rumination, via explicit instructions (Experiments 1 and 2) and via implicit 
induction of interpretative biases (Experiment 3), before being exposed to a failure experience. In all three 
studies, participants trained into the mode antithetical to depressive rumination demonstrated less 
emotional reactivity following failure than participants trained into the mode consistent with depressive 
rumination. These findings provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that processing mode 
modifies emotional reactivity and support the processing mode theory of rumination.  
Keywords: processing mode, emotional reactivity, rumination, training, overgeneralization, depression 
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 Depressive rumination, defined as “behavior and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s 
depressive symptoms and on the implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p.569) has 
been identified as a core process in the onset and maintenance of depression. Prospective longitudinal 
studies have found that self-reported depressive rumination predicts the likelihood, severity, and duration 
of syndromal depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojević & Alloy, 2001).  
One potential mechanism by which depressive rumination may contribute to the onset and 
maintenance of depression is via influencing emotional reactivity. Emotional reactivity is conceptualized 
as the change in the quality and intensity of affect in response to an emotionally evocative event, such as 
change in despondency following a failure (e.g., Rottenberg, Gross, Wilhelm, & Gotlib, 2001; Wilson, 
MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). Experimental studies have found that induction of depressive 
rumination intensifies dysphoric mood, increases negative thinking, and impairs problem-solving relative 
to distraction in individuals already in a dysphoric mood, but has no differential effect in individuals who 
are not already dysphoric (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993). These findings suggest that, when there is a negative emotional response to a stressful event, 
depressive rumination will further exacerbate negative affect and negative thinking, whereas when there 
is little or no negative emotional response, rumination will have no further impact. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that when confronted with a stressful event, depressive rumination will further exacerbate 
any negative emotional response produced by the stressor. Consistent with this, increased trait rumination 
is associated with increased emotional reactivity (Thomsen, Jorgensen, Mehlsen, & Zachariae, 2004).  
 Recent evidence has suggested that there are a number of distinct modes of rumination, each of 
which has distinct functional properties, some adaptive and others maladaptive, such that the 
consequences of rumination may, in part, be determined by the processing mode that is active during 
rumination (Watkins, in press). Phenomenologically, depressive rumination is characterized by a 
multidimensional configuration of focus on self and symptoms, self-evaluation, repeated analysis of the 
causes, meanings, consequences, and implications of symptoms of depression, negative social 
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comparisons, and “Why?” type questions (Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998; Treynor, Gonzalez, & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).  
 Moreover, this processing configuration is implicated in the detrimental effects of rumination. 
In studies of patients with major depression, Watkins and colleagues have compared two variants of the 
standard rumination manipulation. These constitute (a) an abstract, verbal-analytical, evaluative 
variant, consistent with the phenomenology of depressive rumination, in which participants are 
instructed to “think about the causes, meanings, and consequences” of their symptoms and feelings, 
and (b) a concrete, experiential variant, inconsistent with the phenomenology of depressive rumination, 
in which participants are instructed to “focus attention on the experience of” their symptoms and 
feelings. Compared to the abstract, evaluative variant, the concrete, experiential variant reduced 
overgeneral autobiographical memory recall (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004), 
reduced negative global self-evaluations (Rimes & Watkins, 2005), and improved social problem 
solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005), indicating that processing mode influences the consequences of 
rumination.  
These results prompted the development of the processing mode theory of rumination, which 
proposes that the negative cognitive and emotional consequences of rumination, including emotional 
reactivity, are, in part, determined by the processing configuration adopted during focus on self, 
feelings and problems, with the mode consistent with depressive rumination having maladaptive 
consequences, and modes antithetical to this configuration having adaptive consequences (Moberly & 
Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Thus, the processing mode theory 
hypothesizes that processing mode will influence variation in emotional reactivity. To directly test this 
prediction, it is necessary to experimentally manipulate the processing mode active during the stressful 
event, in order to assess consequent changes in emotional response. Inducing a processing mode 
consistent with the processing configuration found in depressive rumination (henceforth ‘depressive 
rumination mode’ or ‘DR mode’) is relatively straightforward: There is general consensus that this 
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mode is characterized by abstract, evaluative, and analytical processing. In order to induce a processing 
mode inconsistent with the processing configuration found in depressive rumination (henceforth ‘mode 
antithetical to depressive rumination’ or ‘A-DR mode’), the manipulation needs to produce a mode of 
processing that is phenomenologically different from the processing configuration found in depressive 
rumination, and, in particular, differs on those dimensions that are the active elements influencing the 
consequences of ruminative self-focus.  
One relevant dimension within the processing mode theory is the relative degree of high-level, 
abstract construals versus low-level, concrete construals (Watkins, in press). Research on mental 
representation in the cognitive and social-cognitive literatures makes a distinction between higher- and 
lower-level construals (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope, 1989; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). High-level 
construals are abstract, general, superordinate, and decontextualized mental representations that convey 
the essential gist and meaning of events and actions (e.g., inferences of global traits that are invariant 
across different situations, such as “laziness”, or representations of “why” an action is performed and 
of its ends and consequences). In contrast, low-level construals are more concrete mental 
representations that include subordinate, contextual, and incidental details of events and actions (e.g., 
inferences of situation-specific states, such as “tiredness”, or representations of the specific “how” 
details of an action and of the means to an end). Within this construal-level analysis, the processing 
configuration or “mindset” characteristic of depressive rumination involves predominantly high-level 
construals about self and mood: ruminative thinking is focused on meanings, consequences, 
implications, and “why” questions, and is characterized by reduced concreteness of thinking (Stöber & 
Borkovec, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005, 2007). Furthermore, those experimental manipulations that 
demonstrate antithetical effects to depressive rumination, such as reducing overgeneral memory and 
improving problem-solving, despite involving equivalent focus on self and feelings, are characterized 
by low-level construals, such as focus on direct, concrete experience and more specific, detailed 
  Processing Mode and Emotional Reactivity  6 
representations of the self and of problems (Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).  
 Moreover, there are reasons to suppose that level of construal could directly account for variations 
in emotional reactivity. Whereas low-level construals involve contextualized representations, high-level 
construals engender generalizations. Thus, in the context of a negative event, relative to low-level 
construals, high-level construals are likely to produce negative overgeneralizations (e.g., “I am always 
making mistakes”), such that a single failure is generalized to a global sense of personal inadequacy 
(Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Rimes & Watkins, 2005). Such generalization is known to increase risk for 
depression (Carver, 1998) and exacerbate emotional reactivity (Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Moreover, 
voluntarily recalling an emotional event in specific detail produces less emotional response than recalling 
it at a more general level (Philippot, Baeyens, & Douilliez, 2006; Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003), 
and practicing recalling specific autobiographical memories reduces the negative experience to a 
subsequent stressful task relative to prior practice at recalling general autobiographical memories (Raes, 
Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006). Thus, by influencing the extent of generalization, processing 
characterized by high-level construals is hypothesized to exacerbate emotional reactivity relative to 
processing characterized by low-level construals.  
The processing mode theory therefore predicts that adopting a processing mode characterized by 
high-level construals, consistent with depressive rumination (DR mode), will increase subsequent 
emotional reactivity, compared to adopting a processing mode characterized by low-level construals, 
inconsistent with depressive rumination (A-DR mode). In order to test this prediction, the current studies 
were designed to induce a mindset either consistent with or inconsistent with the processing configuration 
found in depressive rumination (i.e., abstract, evaluative, analytical), rather than to induce a state directly 
analogous to depressive rumination itself. In this way, the studies only tested the role of one particular 
element of rumination—the processing mode adopted—in influencing emotional reactivity.     
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In a preliminary study using this approach, participants repeatedly focused on both positive and 
negative scenarios in either a low-level, concrete construal mode (“imagine the details of what is 
happening in each scenario”) or a high-level, abstract construal mode (“think about the causes, 
meanings, and implications of each situation”), before a failure experience (Moberly & Watkins, 2006). 
After the failure experience, higher levels of trait rumination were associated with lower levels of 
positive affect, but only for participants in the high-level, abstract construal condition and not for 
participants in the low-level, concrete construal condition. Thus, processing mode moderated the effect 
of trait rumination on emotional reactivity following a failure. However, this study was limited in only 
utilizing a student sample tested in a group practical class and in only using positive affect as the 
measure of mood. To confirm relevance to depression, replication of the finding is needed with a 
depression-related measure (e.g., despondency). Moreover, the processing mode theory predicts that 
mode alone can causally influence emotional reactivity; therefore a direct demonstration of a main 
effect of processing mode on emotional reactivity, coupled with Moberly and Watkins (2006) findings 
would provide convergent evidence consistent with the processing mode theory.  
 To that end, this article reports three experiments that investigate the hypothesis that processing 
mode can causally influence subsequent emotional reactivity. Experiment 1 examines whether an 
extensive training procedure delivered in an individual format produces a main effect of processing 
mode on subsequent emotional reactivity. Experiment 2 examines whether the effects of Experiment 1 
can be replicated and adds a no-training control condition in order to explore whether the effect of 
manipulating processing mode on emotional reactivity is due to a maladaptive effect of DR mode or 
due to a beneficial effect of A-DR mode. Experiment 3 further tests the hypothesis that level of 
construal is an active element within the different processing modes, by utilizing a different 
methodology (implicit training of interpretative bias) that is nevertheless conceptually consistent with 
the induction of high-level versus low-level construals. In each experiment, participants worked 
through a set of emotional scenarios, in a manner designed to train them to adopt either DR mode or A-
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DR mode. Following these training protocols, participants were exposed to an anagram stress failure 
manipulation designed to induce negative mood. Variations in emotional reactivity were revealed by 
variations in the degree to which the stress task altered self-reported mood (Wilson et al., 2006).  
 In summary, the aim of these studies was to test whether processing mode plays a causal role in 
influencing emotional reactivity and, more specifically, whether shifting processing away from a 
mindset characteristic of depressive rumination reduces emotional reactivity. Across all three 
experiments, we hypothesized that those participants trained into A-DR mode should show attenuated 
emotional reactivity, relative to those participants trained into DR mode. We expected that training 
itself would not directly affect mood because the processing mode theory predicts that the different 
modes change the way information is processed rather than the content and valence of what is 
processed. Furthermore, the training conditions matched positive and negative scenarios, so there 
should be no overall mood induction effect or valence effect across the different training conditions. 
Moreover, previous studies have failed to find any direct mood induction effect of manipulating 
processing mode (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Likewise, we 
expected that there would be no difference in the magnitude of self-focus induced across the training 
conditions as the training conditions were balanced for extent of self-reference. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Overview 
This experiment consisted of a processing mode induction training phase, followed by a failure 
stress phase. During the training phase, all participants read through 30 short descriptions of positive and 
negative situations while imagining each event happening to them. Each participant was allocated at 
random to instructions designed to induce either high-level construals consistent with depressive 
rumination or low-level construals inconsistent with depressive rumination, when processing each 
situation. After this training phase, participants attempted one item from a social problem-solving task, 
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which was then rated as a manipulation check of the induction of the intended mode. Following this 
training phase, all participants then completed an anagram stressor task designed to induce the experience 
of failure and despondent mood.  
Participants 
Forty participants were recruited from a panel of community and student volunteers (age, M = 
25.93, SD = 5.91; 10 male, 30 female; 25% students, 75% community volunteers). All participants were 
paid £10 ($20) on completion of the experiment. No participants met diagnostic criteria for current or past 
major depression on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & 
First, 1996) and all scored less than 12 on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (M = 1.77, SD = 1.58; Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996). The participants were randomly allocated to one of two training conditions 
designed to induce DR mode and A-DR mode respectively. There were no differences between 
participants in the two conditions on any of the baseline measures (age, BDI, initial despondency), all Fs 
< 1. A chi-squared analysis revealed that there was no difference in allocation of gender across the 
conditions, p = .71. 
Materials  
Level-of-construal training conditions. Fifteen positive and 15 negative written scenarios, each 
approximately three sentences in length, were used as the training material for all participants. For 
example, one negative scenario read as follows:  
“You have an argument with your best friend. You have only had a few minor disagreements in the 
past, but this argument becomes heated and she tells you that she feels that she will never be able to 
trust you again. You are shocked and hurt”. 
For example, one positive scenario read as follows: 
“You go for a job interview. You are well prepared and able to answer the questions competently. The 
interview panel is friendly and encouraging, and you leave feeling very confident that you had 
performed well enough to secure the position.” 
  Processing Mode and Emotional Reactivity  10 
All participants read through all 30 scenarios, with instructions to spend a minute concentrating on 
each event. The order of the written scenarios was randomized with the constraint that there were no more 
than three scenarios of the same valence presented consecutively. Both positive and negative scenarios 
were used for the training conditions to ensure the training conditions were not direct mood inductions. 
Rather, the training conditions were designed to ensure that the intended processing configuration was 
trained to both positive and negative scenarios.  
 To prepare the training materials, we generated 34 scenarios that reflected positive and negative 
events across a range of settings (social, interpersonal, academic, employment) relevant to our participant 
sample. Ten independent judges rated each scenario on 1-7 Likert scales for valence from 1 (extremely 
positive) to 4 (neutral) to 7 (extremely negative) and vividness from 1 (extremely vivid) to 7 (not at all 
vivid). We selected 15 positive and 15 negative scenarios that were matched for intensity of valence and 
vividness, and significantly different in terms of positive versus negative valence (positive items, M = 
1.76, SD = 0.40; negative items, M = 6.03, SD = 0.49; t(9) = 22.00, p < .01).   
In the DR mode condition, participants were instructed as follows for each scenario: “I would like 
you to think about why it happened, and to analyze the causes, meanings, and implications of this event”. 
In the A-DR mode condition, participants were instructed as follows for each scenario: “I would like you 
to focus on how it happened, and to imagine in your mind as vividly and concretely as possible a ‘movie’ 
of how this event unfolded”. Thus, DR mode was characterized by high-level construals, whereas A-DR 
mode was designed to be antithetical to the ruminative configuration by focusing on low-level construals. 
Given that the training conditions were matched for degree of self-reference, we did not expect any 
difference in the magnitude of self-focus induced by the different training conditions. 
Prior to the main training phase, all of the participants practiced adopting the assigned mode on 
the same (negative) practice scenario and described what they were thinking during the practice. Where 
necessary, further feedback and practice were given to ensure that participants understood the instructions 
and were adopting the appropriate mode before training started.   
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Anagram stress task—failure feedback. The failure feedback task consisted of an anagram solution 
task, consisting of 15 hard-to-solve anagrams and 15 insoluble anagrams, each five letters long. 
Participants were given 3 min to unscramble as many anagrams as possible into real words. Before 
starting the task, participants were told that on average five to six anagrams are correctly solved in 3 min 
and that performance on this task is a consistent and reliable indicator of future academic and career 
success. Versions of this task have reliably been found to induce negative mood in previous studies 
(MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). All participants were told how many 
anagrams they had solved correctly (on average, 1 out of 30) and that they had scored well below 
average. 
Mood measure. To measure negative mood, we used a visual analogue scale on which participants 
rated level of despondency from 0 (not at all) to 100 (completely). This measure has been previously 
found to be a reliable and sensitive self-report measure of negative mood (e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002; 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004).  
Self-focus measure. To assess self-focus, we used a visual analogue scale on which participants 
rated how much their thinking was focused on themselves on a 0–100 scale ranging from 0 (not at all 
self-focused) to 100 (totally self-focused).   
BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report instrument developed to measure 
severity of depression in adults and adolescents (range = 0-63).  
Manipulation check for level-of-construal processing configuration. To check whether training 
successfully induced the intended mode of processing, participants were given one interpersonal vignette 
(“A disagreement with your boss”) from the Means Ends Problem Solving Task (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 
1972; Platt & Spivack, 1975), and asked to generate the ideal strategy for overcoming the problem 
situation (Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992). A judge unaware of condition scored each participant’s 
description of his or her problem solutions on Stöber and Borkovec’s (2002) abstract-concrete scale. The 
descriptions are rated on a 1-5 Likert scale, on which 1 = abstract, 2 = somewhat abstract, 3 = neither-
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nor, 4 = somewhat concrete, 5 = concrete. Concrete thought is defined as “distinct, situationally specific, 
unequivocal, clear, singular” and abstract thought as “indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, unclear, 
aggregated” (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002, p. 92). Thus, the abstract-concrete scale accurately captures the 
dimension of high-level versus low-level construals: more abstract ratings reflect general, superordinate, 
and decontextualized representations, which are more consistent with high-level construals than with low-
level construals. There was good inter-rater reliability with an independent second judge who was also 
unaware of condition (agreement across all responses was r = .95, κ = .91).  
Procedure 
Each participant was seen individually. Participants were given the rationale that the researchers 
were examining the processes of imagination, visualization, and cognition. After giving written informed 
consent, participants completed the BDI and SCID, followed by the first self-report measures of 
despondency and self-focus (pretraining measures). Participants then worked through their assigned 
experimental training condition before repeating the self-report measures (posttraining measures). 
Participants then completed the MEPS problem vignette followed by further self-report measures 
(prestress measures). Participants then attempted the anagram stress task, before completing the self-
report measures again (poststress measures). Finally, open-ended questions investigated what the 
participants thought the study was testing; no participants guessed that the training phase was designed to 
shift the response to the failure stress task.  
Results 
 Following MacLeod et al. (2002) and Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, and Rutherford (2006), the 
analysis of the data is organized sequentially to address whether the training procedures were effective at 
inducing the intended processing modes, before addressing whether the training conditions influenced 
emotional reactivity. We need first to determine that the training procedures were effective at 
differentially inducing DR mode versus A-DR mode, before we can analyze the despondency ratings 
prestress and poststress to examine whether the manipulation of processing mode influenced the 
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emotional response to the stressor. For this and all later experiments, an alpha level of .05 was used for all 
statistical tests and all analyses were two-tailed.  
Testing the Induction of Different Processing Configurations 
We used ratings of abstractness-concreteness for the descriptions of problem solutions that were 
written immediately post-training to index the level-of-construal. A univariate analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with training condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between group factor examined the 
independent ratings of the concreteness of the solution description to determine whether the training 
succeeded in differentially inducing processing modes that varied in level-of-construal. There was a 
significant main effect of condition on ratings of concreteness, F(1, 38) = 10.13, p < .005, reflecting that 
solution descriptions were rated as more abstract in the DR mode condition (M = 2.85, SD = 0.59) than in 
the A-DR mode condition (M = 3.45, SD = 0.60). This result suggests that DR mode training induced a 
processing configuration characterized by higher-level construals than A-DR mode training. 
 Self-focus.  We examined the visual analogue ratings of self-focus to determine whether induction 
of self-focus varied between the training conditions using a mixed-design 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training 
Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between group factor and Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) 
as the repeated measures factor. Consistent with our prediction that the training conditions would not 
differ in the extent to which they induced self-focus, no significant main effects or interactions were 
obtained (all Fs < 1.30).    
Testing Emotional Responses 
As noted by MacLeod et al. (2002), the training procedure itself could act as a direct mood 
induction. Therefore, we followed the two-step approach to analysis adopted by MacLeod et al. (2002) to 
assess the effects of training on emotional reactivity. First, we analyzed data from the despondency scales 
administered before and after the training task, to determine whether the training conditions induced 
differential levels of despondency. Then, we analyzed the data from the despondency ratings administered 
before and after the anagram stress task, to test the hypothesis that the training conditions would modify 
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emotional reactivity. The despondency scores at each assessment point during the training phase and the 
stress phase are shown in Table 1.  
Despondency during Training Phase 
 A mixed-design 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the 
between groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as the repeated measures factor, and rating of 
despondency as the dependent variable found a significant main effect of time, F(1, 38) = 11.31, p < .005, 
reflecting an increase in despondency across the training phase for both conditions (see Table 1). Of 
particular importance, there was no main effect of Training Condition, nor a significant interaction of 
Training Condition × Time (F < 1 in both cases). Thus, it appears that the training procedures had no 
significant differential influence on despondency, suggesting that the manipulation of processing mode 
did not have a direct mood induction effect.  
Emotional Reactivity 
 A mixed-design 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the 
between groups factor, Time (prestress vs. poststress) as the repeated measures factor, and rating of 
despondency as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 38) = 14.86, p < 
.001, qualified by a significant interaction of Condition × Time, F(1, 38) = 4.72, p < .05. This interaction 
reflected a significant increase in despondency from prestress to poststress in the DR mode condition, 
t(19) = 3.70, p < .002, (95% CI, 9.33, 33.67), but a non significant increase in despondency in the A-DR 
mode condition, t(19) = 1.45, p = .16, (95% CI, -2.64, 14.64).  
Discussion 
These findings provide encouraging support for the hypothesis that processing mode may causally 
modify emotional reactivity: Inducing a processing mode involving high-level construals produced 
greater emotional response to a subsequent stressful event than inducing a processing configuration 
involving low-level construals. The training procedure appeared to be effective in manipulating 
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processing configuration: Compared to the A-DR mode condition, the DR mode condition produced more 
abstract and general descriptions of problem solutions on the MEPS posttraining, consistent with inducing 
a mode characterized by high-level construals.  
The results found for the despondency ratings across the training phase indicate that, as expected, 
the manipulation of processing mode did not influence mood: the two training conditions did not differ in 
their effects on despondency. Furthermore, the two training conditions did not differ in the extent to 
which they induced self-focus. These findings demonstrate that the manipulation of training condition 
neither had a direct mood induction effect nor a direct effect on self-focus. Critically, the induction of the 
different processing configurations modified emotional reactivity: Inducing DR mode resulted in a greater 
increase in despondency in response to the subsequent anagram stress task than inducing A-DR mode. 
This finding extends Moberly and Watkins’ (2006) results by demonstrating that more extensive training 
delivered in an individual format has a main effect on modifying emotional reactivity. 
One issue unresolved in Experiment 1 is whether the differential effect observed between the two 
training conditions is due to the DR mode condition actively increasing emotional reactivity, due to the 
A-DR mode condition actively reducing emotional reactivity, or due to a combination of both these 
processes. In Experiment 1, there was no control condition where processing mode was not trained, which 
is necessary to distinguish between these possibilities. Therefore, to explore the active roles of the 
different modes, in Experiment 2, we introduced a no-training control condition. Failure and unexpected 
outcomes, such as those produced in the anagram stressor task, can temporarily increase the use of 
higher-level construals in the form of “why” questions that are concerned with attributing the cause of the 
outcome (Wicklund, 1986; Wong & Weiner, 1981). Therefore, we predicted that the anagram stressor test 
would spontaneously lead to higher-level construals for participants in the no-training control condition, 
and that the no-training control condition would increase emotional reactivity to a similar degree as the 
DR mode condition and to a lesser degree than the A-DR mode condition.    
Experiment 2 
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 The principal purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the central finding of Experiment 1. The 
same training procedure and anagram stress task were used in Experiment 2 as were used in Experiment 
1, except that we added a no-training control condition.   
Method 
Overview 
 The same design and materials as for Experiment 1 were used, except that participants were 
randomly allocated to three conditions: DR mode training, A-DR mode training, and a no-training 
control.  
Participants 
Sixty-three naïve participants were recruited, using the same selection criteria as Experiment 1, 
from community volunteers and undergraduates, and assigned randomly to one of DR mode (n = 21), A-
DR mode (n = 21), or control no-training condition (n = 21; age, M = 23.21, SD = 9.14; 13 male, 49 
female; BDI, M = 4.37, SD = 2.98). Participants were rewarded for taking part with either £10 ($20) or 
course credits. There were no differences between the three conditions on any of the baseline measures, 
all Fs < 1.1, smallest p = .34. A chi-squared analysis revealed that there was no difference in the gender 
distribution across the conditions, p = .51. 
Materials  
Level-of-construal training conditions. Participants in the control non-training condition worked 
through the same 30 scenarios as the other participants, and as in Experiment 1. They were instructed as 
follows: “I would now like you to spend a minute concentrating on this text. Specifically, I would like 
you to count the number of verbs that occur in the description of this event”. These instructions were 
chosen to ensure that participants read the text, without inducing either DR mode or A-DR mode.  
Manipulation check for processing configuration. We repeated the use of the MEPS scenario with 
the rating of concreteness of solution description as a manipulation check for the processing configuration 
  Processing Mode and Emotional Reactivity  17 
adopted posttraining. There was good inter-rater reliability with an independent second judge who was 
unaware of condition (agreement across all responses was r = .72, κ = .73).  
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1. Open-ended questions investigated what the 
participants thought the study was testing; no participants guessed that the training phase was designed to 
shift the response to the failure task.  
Results 
 The same sequence of analysis as used in Experiment 1 was repeated for Experiment 2.  
Testing the Induction of Different Processing Configurations 
 Ratings of abstractness-concreteness. As predicted, an ANOVA with training condition (DR 
mode vs. A-DR mode vs. no-training control) as the between group factor, revealed a significant main 
effect of training condition on the rating of concreteness of solution descriptions, F(2, 60) = 4.64, p < .05. 
Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that this main effect reflected the solution descriptions being rated as more 
concrete in the A-DR mode condition (M = 3.43, SD = 0.81) than in the DR mode condition (M = 2.90, 
SD = 0.44), p < .05 (95% CI, 0.10, 0.95), replicating Experiment 1. The no-training control condition (M 
= 3.05, SD = 0.38) did not significantly differ from the DR mode condition, p = .70 (95% CI, -0.28, 0.57), 
whereas there was a trend for the A-DR mode condition to be more concrete than the no-training control, 
p = .09 (95% CI, -0.81, 0.05).  
 Self-focus.  A mixed design 3 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode 
vs. no-training control) as the between group factor, with Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as the 
repeated measures factor, and with self-focus ratings as the dependent variable, revealed no significant 
main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1. These findings suggest that there was no difference in self-focus 
between the training conditions.    
Testing Emotional Responses 
  Processing Mode and Emotional Reactivity  18 
Despondency during training phase. The scores obtained on the despondency scales in each 
training condition before and after the training phase and before and after the anagram stress task are 
presented in Table 2. A mixed-design 3 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode 
vs. no-training control) as the between groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as the repeated 
measures factor, and with rating of despondency as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main 
effect of time, F(1, 60) = 7.90, p < .01, reflecting an increase in despondency across the training phase for 
all three conditions. Of particular importance, there was not a significant interaction of Condition × Time, 
F(2, 60) = 0.19, p = .83, suggesting that the manipulation of processing configuration did not have a 
direct mood induction effect.  
Emotional Reactivity. A mixed design 3 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-
DR mode vs. no-training control) as the between groups factor, Time (prestress vs. poststress) as the 
repeated measures factor, and with rating of despondency as the dependent variable, revealed a significant 
main effect of time, F(1, 60) = 59.31, p < .001, qualified by a significant interaction of Condition × Time, 
F(2, 60) = 3.82, p < .05. This interaction reflected the absence of a significant main effect of Training 
Condition at the prestress assessment, F(2, 60) = 1.28, p =.29, but a significant main effect of Training 
Condition at the poststress assessment, F(2, 60) = 3.44, p < .05. The nature of the interaction is shown in 
Figure 1. As can be seen, although all three conditions displayed an increase in despondency in response 
to the stress task, relative to the DR mode and no-training control conditions, the A-DR mode condition 
attenuated the increase in despondency, extending the finding from Experiment 1. As predicted, the no-
training control condition paralleled the effects of the DR mode condition, with a very similar pattern of 
despondency change across the stress phase, albeit starting at a lower prestress level of despondency. 
Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the increase in despondency from prestress to poststress was 
significantly greater in the DR mode condition than in the A-DR mode condition, p < .05 (95% CI, 1.34, 
40.09), replicating Experiment 1. Moreover, as predicted, the increase in despondency from prestress to 
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poststress did not differ between the DR mode and no-training control conditions, p = .91 (95% CI, -
16.14, 22.61). There was a trend for the increase in despondency from prestress to poststress to be greater 
in the no-training control condition than the A-DR mode condition, p = .08 (95% CI, -1.90, 36.85).   
Discussion 
The principal aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the main finding of Experiment 1. Experiment 
2 was successful in this aim: The results of Experiment 2 confirm the ability of the training procedure to 
manipulate level-of-construal and modify emotional reactivity. Replicating Experiment 1, compared to 
the A-DR mode condition, the DR mode condition produced more abstract descriptions of problem 
solutions on the MEPS posttraining, indicating successful induction of the differential processing 
configurations. Furthermore, replicating Experiment 1, the manipulation of processing configuration had 
no direct mood induction effect, with the three conditions not differing in their effects on despondency. 
Nonetheless, once again, inducing DR mode resulted in greater subsequent emotional reactivity than 
inducing A-DR mode.  
The addition of the no-training control condition provided information about the default 
processing mode adopted by this sample of non-clinical participants, and about the relative contributions 
of the two training manipulations in modifying emotional reactivity. First, the no-training control 
condition did not significantly differ from the DR mode condition on the post-training rating of 
abstractness-concreteness of the problem description, and showed a trend to be more abstract than the A-
DR mode condition. This result suggests that the default response of the untrained participants prior to the 
anagram stressor is similar to that of participants in the DR mode condition. This may be because non-
clinical participants spontaneously adopt a higher-level construal style, consistent with extensive findings 
that individuals tend by default to use more abstract construals (Wegner & Vallacher, 1987; Wegner, 
Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986) and use a more global, abstract processing style in neutral and 
happy moods (Beukeboom & Semin, 2005; Bless et al., 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Storbeck & Clore, 
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2005). Alternatively, in this non-clinical sample, it may have been relatively easier to induce A-DR mode 
than to induce DR mode.   
Second, the confidence intervals suggest that the effects of no-training control condition on 
emotional reactivity overlapped with the effects of the DR mode condition but were distinct from the 
effects of the A-DR mode condition, although there was not a significant (p < .05) difference between A-
DR mode and no-training control. This pattern is broadly consistent with the prediction that participants 
in the no-training control condition would spontaneously adopt higher-level construals in response to the 
unexpected failure (Wong & Weiner, 1981), although this is a tentative interpretation that requires 
replication. Assuming that the response following the no-training control reflects the default response to 
failure, these results suggest that prior A-DR training reduces this default response to failure (i.e., abstract 
processing and elevated emotional reactivity), suggesting that training in A-DR mode has some active 
effect. Nonetheless, since the default mode adopted in the no-training control is similar to the DR mode, it 
is unclear whether the A-DR mode would have a beneficial effect when compared to a more neutral non-
ruminative control condition.  
 Experiments 1 and 2 both suggested that the manipulation of processing mode modifies  
emotional reactivity. Moreover, consistent with the hypothesis that level-of-construal is an important 
property discriminating between DR mode and A-DR mode, explicit instructions designed to produce 
low-level construals resulted in less emotional reactivity than explicit instructions designed to produce 
high-level construals. Experiment 3 further tested the level-of-construal hypothesis by manipulating 
processing mode via a different method that is nevertheless conceptually consistent with inducing high-
level versus low-level construals. If a methodologically different training manipulation that is also 
conceptually consistent with shifting level-of-construal is able to replicate these effects on emotional 
reactivity, this provides further confirmation that level-of-construal may be a key active property within 
the different processing modes.   
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The manipulations in Experiments 1 and 2 involved explicit, voluntary, and transparent mental 
generation of the different processing configurations. Therefore, in Experiment 3 we adopted a more 
implicit training protocol in which participants were guided more covertly into the different modes to 
test whether we could conceptually replicate the finding that processing mode influences emotional 
reactivity. To do this, we adapted a computerized task used to induce interpretative bias (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000): Whereas the original task forced participants to make either a negative or a positive 
interpretation of otherwise ambiguous texts, our version forced participants to make interpretations of 
otherwise ambiguous texts that either involved high-level construals or low-level construals. In an 
unpublished pilot study using this paradigm with 40 participants, we found that the DR mode and A-
DR mode conditions differentially influenced the ability to generate the reasons why a behavior was 
performed versus how it was performed (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Consistent with the intended 
processing configurations, the DR mode condition significantly increased the number of “why’s” 
generated but reduced the number of “how’s” generated, relative to the A-DR mode condition. Thus, 
this pilot data provides initial evidence that this interpretative bias training paradigm can successfully 
induce high-level versus low-level construals.   
 A further aim of Experiment 3 was to examine whether our previous findings would generalize to 
a more inclusive sample and to a wider range of moods. To this end, we used a sample with relatively 
higher levels of depressive symptoms compared to the first two experiments. Moreover, instead of a 
single self-rating of despondency, we used the Positive and Negative Adjective Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to assess mood. The inclusion of the PANAS allowed us to check that 
we could replicate our previous findings on a more elaborate and methodologically superior measure that 
encompassed more facets of positive and negative mood, including aspects of negative affect that are not 
necessarily related to depression (e.g., high arousal).   
Experiment 3 
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Method 
Overview 
 The training phase of this paradigm consisted of the following: (a) participants read 64 computer-
presented short descriptions of social situations that remain ambiguous in overall meaning, until the final 
word, presented as a fragment to be completed, which resolved the overall meaning for each scenario; (b) 
Across all the scenarios, each word fragment was chosen to lead the participant into making the required 
interpretation for the intended training condition; (c) Following each scenario, participants answered a 
subsequent comprehension question designed to further reinforce the required interpretation. Whereas 
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) induced positive versus negative interpretations, we induced 
interpretations consistent with high-level construals (DR mode) or with low-level construals (A-DR 
mode). In other respects, we followed the methodology described by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) 
(see Experiment 1, Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000, for full details). 
Participants 
Forty naïve participants were recruited from a panel of undergraduate volunteers (age, M = 19.38, 
SD = 1.46; 12 male, 28 female). Participants were rewarded for taking part with either £6 ($12) or course 
credits. We included participants with minimal to moderate levels of depression symptoms (BDI-II score 
< 25; mean BDI score = 9.88, SD = 6.31). The participants were randomly allocated to two training 
conditions designed respectively to induce DR mode and A-DR mode. There were no differences between 
the two conditions on any of the baseline measures (BDI, age, initial positive affect, initial negative 
affect), all Fs < 1.16, smallest p = .28. The two training conditions were matched for gender (14 females 
and 6 males in each condition).  
Materials  
Interpretative bias training conditions. The 64 training descriptions consisted of two or three 
sentences and remained ambiguous in terms of whether they suggested an interpretation consistent with 
DR mode or with A-DR  until the final word fragment, which alone determined the processing 
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configuration. Each fragment only allowed one completion, which was congruent with the required 
processing configuration. Of the descriptions, 32 were positive in valence and 32 were negative in 
valence, to ensure that the training phase was not intrinsically mood-inducing. Across the descriptions, 
the DR mode completions disambiguated the sentences so as to generate meanings for each description 
that were abstract, general, evaluative, judgmental, and conceptual. In contrast, the A-DR mode 
completions disambiguated the sentences so as to generate meanings for each description that were 
concrete, specific, experiential, and sensory-focused. 
 For example, one negative description read as follows (with final words and condition in 
parentheses): 
You are running a bath when you become distracted by a telephone call and forget to turn off the 
tap. The bath floods and the water begins to drip through the ceiling of the room below. Cleaning up the 
mess, you feel irritated because you are so w_t [wet, low-level construal, A-DR mode]/ c_reless [careless, 
high-level construal, DR mode]. 
Another negative description read as follows: 
 You have been seeing each other for three weeks, and it seems that you have found a true 
soulmate. After dinner one evening, your partner explains that you can’t be together anymore. At that 
moment, you stare at the table and contemplate your empty gl_ss [glass, low-level construal, A-DR 
mode] / l-fe [life, high-level construal, DR mode] 
A positive description read as follows: 
You are currently romantically unattached and are not expecting the Valentine's card that drops 
through the letterbox one morning. Your heart warms as it becomes clear that you have a secret admirer. 
Getting into the warm bath, you feel very re_axed [relaxed, low-level construal, A-DR mode] / desir_ble 
[desirable, high-level construal, DR mode] 
Another positive description read as follows: 
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Waiting at the railway station, you bump into an old friend of yours whom you haven't seen for 
years. You go for a drink, gossip about old times and it seems as though you have never been apart. As 
you shake hands you feel the strength of his gr_p [grip, low-level construal, A-DR mode] / lo_alty 
[loyalty, high-level construal, DR mode] 
Thus, the A-DR mode completions were more concrete, more experiential, and more sensory-
focused, describing physical sensations experienced (“wet”, “relaxed”, “grip”) and physical objects 
observed (“glass”). In contrast, the DR mode completions were more evaluative, abstract, and 
generalized, including judgments and global character attributions (“careless”, “desirable”, 
“competence”) as well as abstract evaluations of meaning and implications of events (“life”). Importantly, 
an equivalent number of positive and negative completions were used for each training condition to 
minimize the likelihood that the training conditions differed on valence rather than on mode (high-level 
vs. low-level construals).  
 Ten independent judges each rated all of the scenarios (half the scenarios disambiguated with DR 
mode completions and half disambiguated with A-DR mode completions, disambiguation for each 
scenario counterbalanced across the judges) on a series of 1-9 Likert scales chosen to check that the 
disambiguated completions were consistent with the intended configuration. The scales assessed each 
completed scenario for (a) self-focus from 1 (not at all self-focused) to 9 (very self-focused); (b) focus on 
sensory details from 1 (not at all sensory) to 9 (extremely sensory); (c) evaluation of meanings and 
implications from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely); and (d) use of situation-specific, state-like to more global 
trait-like attributions from 1 (extremely state-like) to 9 (extremely trait-like). Consistent with the intended 
manipulations, on average, relative to the A-DR mode completions, the DR mode completions were rated 
as significantly less focused on sensory details, t(9) = 4.24, p < .005 (DR mode, M = 4.12, SD = 0.97; A-
DR mode, M = 5.55, SD = 0.90), involving more evaluation of meanings and implications, t(9) = 2.19, p 
= .06 (DR mode, M = 6.40, SD = 0.91; A-DR mode, M = 5.42, SD = 1.27) and involving more trait-like, 
global attributions, t(9) = 2.24, p = .05 (DR mode, M = 4.49, SD = 0.64; A-DR mode, M = 3.74, SD = 
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1.01). That is, the DR mode completions were more evaluative, abstract, and generalized, including 
judgments and character-level attributions consistent with higher-level construals, than the A-DR mode 
completions. The DR mode and A-DR mode completions were matched for self-focus, t(9) = 0.77, p = 
.46 (DR mode, M = 6.16, SD = 0.59; A-DR mode, M = 6.00, SD = 0.87).  
To progress to the next description, participants had to correctly type in the missing letter of the 
fragment and then respond to a comprehension question about the description. The comprehension 
questions were designed to further induce the intended processing configuration. For example, for the 
first negative passage shown above, the question in the A-DR mode condition was “Do you manage to 
keep yourself dry?” which focused on concrete details of the experience. In contrast, in the DR mode 
condition, the question was “Do you think that you are not to blame?” which focused on more abstract 
evaluations and judgments about what had happened. Participants had 10 s to respond either ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’ following each question. Answers were followed by feedback (a “correct” or “wrong” message) 
consistent with the intended processing mode, both when generating a response to the word fragment and 
when answering the comprehension question.  
Recognition Test. The training descriptions were immediately followed by another set of 18 brief 
descriptions of social situations, each negative, different in context from the training situations, headed 
with a brief identifying title, and presented in random order. Unlike the training descriptions which 
directed participants towards a particular mode of responding, the recognition descriptions, while 
superficially similar to the training descriptions, used word fragments whose completion allowed either a 
high-level construal, DR mode interpretation or a low-level construal, A-DR mode interpretation, leaving 
participants free to generate their own response. A sample identifying title, test paragraph and 
comprehension question is as follows: 
The wedding speech 
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You have been asked to give a speech at your best friend’s wedding reception. You are poorly prepared 
and make many hesitations and slips while speaking. Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant 
murmur of voic_s [voices]. 
Is your best friend getting married? (Yes/No) 
 After participants worked through a short filler task, a computer-based recognition test was used 
to assess the interpretations that were made of these paragraphs. In an individually randomized order, 
participants read the identifying title of each test paragraph, followed by four versions of the final 
sentence, also in random order. Two of these sentences reflected plausible interpretations of the paragraph 
(“target” interpretations), one consistent with high-level construals (DR mode) and the other consistent 
with low-level construals (A-DR mode). Two of these sentences reflected implausible interpretations of 
the paragraph (“foil” interpretations), one consistent with DR mode and the other consistent with A-DR 
mode. For example, for the title and test paragraph presented above, the recognition sentences were: 
(a) Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of words (target, low-level construal, A-
DR mode) 
(b) Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of disapproval (target, high-level 
construal, DR mode) 
(c) Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of aircraft (foil, low-level construal, A-
DR mode) 
(d) Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of resentment (foil, high-level construal, 
DR mode) 
 Participants were told that none of the sentences were identical to those in the original paragraph 
but that any number of them could be similar in meaning to the original paragraph. Participants were 
instructed to rate each sentence, independently of all others, for its similarity in meaning to the original 
sentence using a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (very different in meaning) to 4 (very similar in meaning). 
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 Ten independent raters rated the plausible recognition targets (half of each mode, DR mode versus 
A-DR mode, counterbalanced across raters) and ten independent raters rated the implausible recognition 
foils (half of each mode, DR mode versus A-DR mode, counterbalanced across raters), with the Likert 
scales used to rate the processing configuration of the training completions. We examined these ratings 
using a mixed design 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Sentence Target (target interpretation vs. foil interpretation) as 
the between subjects factor, and Sentence Meaning (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the within subjects 
factor. As intended, there were a number of significant main effects for Sentence Meaning1. Relative to 
the recognition sentences designed to be consistent with A-DR mode, the recognition sentences designed 
to be consistent with DR mode were rated as significantly less sensory-focused, F(1, 18) = 16.65, p < 
.001 (DR mode, M = 4.18, SD = 1.44; A-DR mode, M = 5.64, SD = 1.20), involving significantly more 
evaluation of meanings and implications, F(1, 18) = 15.43, p < .001 (DR mode, M = 6.34, SD = 0.98; A-
DR mode, M = 5.02, SD = 1.23) and involving significantly more global, trait-level attributions, F(1, 18) 
= 5.93, p < .05 (DR mode, M = 4.49, SD = 1.23; A-DR mode, M = 3.68, SD = 1.59). Thus, the different 
recognition sentences do seem to index the intended processing configurations, with the DR mode 
recognition sentences reflecting higher-level construals than the A-DR mode recognition sentences. 
 Mood measure—Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). The 
PANAS consists of two 10-item scales measuring positive affect (e.g., “interested”, “excited”, “proud”) 
and negative affect (e.g., “distressed”, “upset”, “scared”). Each item is rated for the extent to which the 
participants feels that way right now on a 5-point scale from 1 (very slightly/not at all) to 5 (extremely). 
The PANAS has been found to be a reliable and valid measure of mood (Watson et al., 1988) and has 
been used extensively in experimental research. 
Anagram stressor task—failure feedback. The failure feedback task was a computerized version of 
the anagram solution task used in Experiments 1 and 2 that included only the 15 solvable anagrams. The 
instructions informed participants that performance was related to intelligence, academic and career 
success and that they were expected to solve about 40-60% of the anagrams. During the task, each of the 
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anagrams was presented for 20 s, after which participants were given 10 s to type in the solution. The 
computer then displayed ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ feedback, together with the correct solution and the 
proportion of anagrams solved so far. All participants solved fewer than 40% of the anagrams (M = 
15.5%, SD = 11.1%, range = 0–33%). 
Procedure 
Each participant was seen individually. Participants were given the rationale that the researchers 
were examining the processes of imagination, visualization, and cognition. After giving written informed 
consent, participants completed the BDI, and then completed the first PANAS measure of mood, which 
was administered via computer (pretraining measure). Participants then worked through the training phase 
in their assigned experimental condition. After all the training descriptions had been completed, 
participants began the recognition descriptions. This was followed by a 2 min unrelated filler task, (a 
computerized version of the speed of comprehension test; Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992) in 
which participants made judgments as rapidly as possible as to whether sentences were true or false (e.g., 
“Admirals are people”, “Beef steaks are footwear”). After this, participants completed the recognition 
ratings, with instructions emphasizing the need to rate each sentence independently of the others. A 
further computer-based PANAS measure of mood (posttraining/prestress measure) was then completed. 
Participants then attempted the anagram task designed to induce the experience of failure, before rating 
their mood again via the computerized PANAS (poststress measure). The computer software E-Prime was 
used to administer the study materials and to collect participants’ responses. 
Results 
 The same sequence of analysis used in Experiments 1 and 2 was repeated in Experiment 3.  
Testing the Induction of Different Processing Configurations - Recognition Ratings 
We calculated a level-of-construal index consisting of the ratings for the high-level construal (DR 
mode) recognition statements minus the ratings for the low-level construal (A-DR mode) recognition 
statements, such that higher scores on the index indicate a greater endorsement of higher-level construals 
  Processing Mode and Emotional Reactivity  29 
consistent with DR mode. If the manipulation was successful, participants trained in the DR mode would 
have higher scores on this level-of-construal index than participants trained in the A-DR mode.  
A mixed design ANOVA with Training Condition as the between subjects factor (DR mode vs. A-
DR mode), sentence target (plausible target interpretation vs. implausible foil interpretation) as the 
within-subject factor, and the level-of-construal index as the dependent variable revealed a large main 
effect of target, F(1, 38) = 31.78, p < 0.01, indicating higher level-of-construal index for implausible 
rather than plausible interpretations. Critically, as predicted, there was a significant main effect of 
condition, F(1, 38) = 8.11, p < 0.01, reflecting more endorsement of high-level construals in DR mode (M 
= 0.35, SD = 0.29) than in A-DR mode (M = 0.09, SD = 0.28). The interaction between target and 
condition was not significant, F(1, 38) = 1.63, ns. These results provide confirmation that the DR mode 
condition was successful in inducing a mindset more characteristic of depressive rumination than the A-
DR mode condition.  
Testing Emotional Responses 
Mood state during training phase. The scores obtained on the positive and negative affect scales 
in each training condition before and after the training phase, and before and after the stress phase are 
presented in Table 3. A mixed design 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR 
mode) as the between groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) and Scale Type (positive affect 
vs. negative affect) as the repeated measures factors, and score on each affect scale as the dependent 
variable, revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 38) = 61.46, p < .001, reflecting reductions in 
both positive and negative affect across the training phase in both conditions. There was also a significant 
main effect of scale type, F(1, 38) = 90.17, p < .001, reflecting lower scores on the negative affect scale 
than on the positive affect scale. Of particular importance, there was not a significant two-way interaction 
of Condition × Time, F(1, 38) = 1.90, p = .18, nor a significant three-way interaction of Condition × Time 
× Scale Type, F(1, 38) = 0.09, p = .77. These results indicate that there was no direct mood induction 
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effect of manipulating processing configuration and that both training conditions had equivalent direct 
mood induction effects on positive and negative affect. No other significant effects were obtained from 
the ANOVA (all Fs < 1). 
Emotional Reactivity.  A mixed-design 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. 
A-DR mode) as the between groups factor, Time (prestress vs. poststress) and Scale Type (positive affect 
vs. negative affect) as the repeated measures factor, and scores on each affect scale as the dependent 
variable, revealed a significant main effect of scale type, F(1, 38) = 33.54, p < .001, qualified by a 
significant interaction of Scale Type × Time, F(1, 38) = 41.43, p < .001. The main effect reflected 
elevated scores on the positive affect scale compared to the negative affect scale, while the interaction 
reflected an increase in negative affect from prestress to poststress but a decrease in positive affect from 
prestress to poststress, confirming the effectiveness of the anagram stressor as a mood induction. Of 
greater relevance to the hypothesis under test, these effects were subsumed within a significant higher 
order Training Condition × Scale Type × Time interaction, F(1, 38) = 10.32, p < .005. The significance of 
this interaction means that the degree to which the anagram stress task increased negative affect and 
reduced positive affect was modified in different ways for participants in the each training condition. 
Calculation of component effects demonstrated that this higher order interaction was due to significant 
interactions of Condition × Time for each Scale Type, but acting in opposite directions. Thus, for the 
positive affect scale, there was a significant interaction of Condition × Time, F(1, 38) = 8.34, p < .01, 
which reflected a significantly greater decrease in positive affect from prestress to poststress in the DR 
mode condition, t(19) = 7.71, p < .001 (95% CI for decrease in positive affect, 8.23, 14.37), than in the A-
DR mode condition, t(19) = 2.03, p = .06 (95% CI, -0.12, 8.32). In contrast, for the negative affect scale, 
there was a significant interaction of Condition × Time, F(1, 38) = 5.91, p < .05, which reflected a 
significantly greater increase in negative affect from prestress to poststress in the DR mode condition, 
t(19) = 3.89, p < .001 (95% CI for increase in negative affect, 5.35, 17.85), than in the A-DR mode 
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condition, t(19) = 2.48, p < .05 (95% CI, 0.55, 6.55). Figure 2 illustrates the simple interaction for 
negative affect. These results confirm that the training conditions had a differential influence on 
emotional reactivity to the subsequent anagram stressor task. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 further support the processing mode theory. They replicate our 
previous findings that inducing A-DR mode reduced subsequent emotional reactivity relative to inducing 
DR mode. Further, this replication strengthens the previous findings because Experiment 3: (a) used a 
means of training processing mode that, while conceptually consistent with the previous manipulations, 
was more implicit; (b) replicated the findings on the PANAS, a more detailed and well-validated measure 
of positive and negative affect. Moreover, the recognition sentences measure confirmed that the DR mode 
training condition produced greater endorsements of sentences consistent with high-level construals than 
the A-DR mode training condition, indicating that the manipulation of processing mode was successful. 
General Discussion 
In a series of three experiments, we have shown that when focused on emotional scenarios, 
compared to inducing a mindset characteristic of that observed in depressive rumination, inducing a 
mindset antithetical to that observed in depressive rumination reduces subsequent emotional reactivity. 
These findings are consistent with our principal hypothesis that processing mode modifies emotional 
response to a stressful event.  
 Across all three experiments, the pattern of results indicates that the two distinct training 
procedures were effective in manipulating the level-of-construal adopted by participants in the intended 
direction. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants in the DR mode condition produced more abstract and 
general solution descriptions, consistent with the processing configuration characteristic of depressive 
rumination, than participants in the A-DR mode condition. Critically, this successful manipulation check 
was (a) on a non-self-report measure and (b) measured approximately five minutes after the end of the 
training phase, indicating that the training produced a shift in thinking that persisted for at least five 
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minutes and was maintained despite the transfer of processing to a new task (problem-solving). In 
Experiment 3, relative to the A-DR mode condition, the DR mode condition resulted in greater 
endorsement of recognition statements which disambiguated previously viewed negative scenarios in a 
way that was consistent with abstract, evaluative, and judgmental interpretations of the ambiguous 
scenarios. Again this effect was observed after a filler task, indicating that training produced a shift in 
processing that could persist for at least several minutes and transfer to another task.  
 Furthermore, these results clearly demonstrate that the different conditions had differential effects 
on emotional reactivity. In all three experiments, the manipulation of processing configuration had no 
direct mood induction effect, with the training conditions not differing in their effects on mood ratings 
from pretraining to posttraining. Furthermore, immediately prior to the anagram stressor task, participants 
in the different training conditions reported equivalent levels of negative mood. Rather, the induction of 
the different processing configurations influenced emotional reactivity across the stress phase: Inducing 
higher-level construals resulted in a greater increase in negative mood (despondency in Experiments 1 
and 2, increases in negative affect and reductions in positive affect in Experiment 3) in response to the 
subsequent anagram stress task than inducing lower-level construals. 
 We believe it unlikely that our findings could be the result of the DR mode condition inducing 
participants to be more self-focused than the A-DR mode condition, and thereby influencing emotional 
reactivity (Ingram, 1990). First across all three studies, the emotional scenarios used were identical across 
the training conditions and each equally focused on self. Second, in both Experiments 1 and 2, we found 
that there was no difference between the training conditions in their effects on self-focus.  
 One might also argue that experimental demand may have contributed to the observed findings. 
Although some contribution of experimental demand can never be completely ruled out, we believe that it 
is unlikely that experimental demand was responsible for our results. First, none of our participants 
deduced that the training conditions were designed to influence their response to the anagram task, nor 
did they comment that the training scenarios were biased in any particular way. Second, as MacLeod et 
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al. (2002) have argued, it seems implausible that experimental demand would lead to an effect of training 
only by influencing the emotional response to a subsequent stressor but not to a direct effect of training 
on mood. Third, whereas Experiments 1 and 2 had explicit training conditions, which potentially could 
have produced demand effects in participants, Experiment 3 had an implicit training procedure, with 
participants receiving no explicit instructions to alter their thinking about emotional events.  
Importantly, the training procedure in Experiment 3 was designed to be methodologically different 
but conceptually equivalent in terms of inducing DR mode versus A-DR mode with respect to the training 
procedures in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, the fact that all three experiments replicate the same main 
findings despite these methodological differences reduces the likelihood that the observed effects are due 
to idiosyncrasies of experimental method or artifacts of each training procedure, and strengthens the 
argument that the observed findings are consistent with the proposed hypothesis. In all three studies, the 
DR mode training conditions focused on inducing high-level construals such as abstract and general 
implications and meanings of events, evaluations, and judgments, which are characteristic of the 
phenomenology of depressive rumination, whereas the A-DR mode condition induced low-level 
construals with a focus on the concrete, specific, sensory-perceptual details of how events happen, 
inconsistent with depressive rumination. Together these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
level-of-construal may be an important dimension distinguishing between processing modes that result in 
unconstructive depressive rumination versus more constructive forms of self-focus.  
 An unexpected finding was the observation that in Experiments 1 and 2, despondency increased 
from pretraining to posttraining, suggesting that the training acted as a negative mood induction, despite 
having equivalent numbers of positive and negative emotional scenarios. This effect was probably not due 
to an imbalance of emotional intensity across the scenarios because the positive scenarios and negative 
scenarios were matched for intensity of valence and vividness. This effect may simply be a consequence 
of boredom and fatigue after 30 training presentations. Alternatively, the negative scenarios may be more 
salient than the positive scenarios, producing an overall negative mood induction, since negative 
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information has greater salience and dominance for subsequent responses than positive information (Ito, 
Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Methodological differences between the 
experiments can explain why the training phase had a negative mood induction effect in Experiments 1 
and 2 but not in Experiment 3. In Experiment 3, the interpretative bias training paradigm is more implicit 
and covert, and, therefore, much less likely to induce negative mood than the more effortful and overt 
training paradigm in Experiments 1 and 2.   
 The observation that the training phase acted as a negative mood induction in Experiments 1 and 2 
raises the question of why we did not observe a differential effect on despondency of the two training 
conditions during the training phase. After all, we hypothesized that relative to training participants into 
DR mode, training participants into A-DR mode would reduce emotional reactivity. Thus, if the training 
itself acted as a mild stressor, one might expect to see the training conditions produce differential 
emotional responses during training itself. However, two potential accounts might explain why this effect 
was not observed. First, the training phase may not have been a powerful enough negative mood 
induction to produce the variations in emotional response necessary to detect the effects of training 
condition on emotional reactivity, unlike the more intense anagram stressor task. The anagram stressor 
task involves an unexpected, involuntary, and real emotional experience, whereas the training involves 
voluntary, deliberate, and imaginary emotional experience. The anagram stressor task is thus likely to 
induce a more intense negative emotion than the training phase. Further, positive and negative scenarios 
were deliberately balanced in the training phase to minimize any overall mood induction effect. 
Consistent with this account, across Experiments 1 and 2, the anagram stressor task resulted in a mean 
increase in despondency three times greater than the mean increase in despondency during the training 
phase (see Tables 1, 2). Second, it may have taken repeated practice on the training items to induce the 
desired processing mode. Thus, throughout much of the training phase, the intended processing mode 
may not have been fully developed and so could not operate effectively to influence emotional reactivity.  
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  The current findings have a number of important theoretical implications. First, our findings 
provide strong support for the hypothesis that a mode of processing consistent with that observed in 
depressive rumination will result in greater emotional reactivity than a mode of processing inconsistent 
with that observed in depressive rumination. These findings indicate that differences in the adoption of 
these processing modes can causally influence emotional reactivity, at least within a non-clinical 
population. These findings are consistent with previous studies which found that a mode of processing 
characterized by a configuration of abstract, comparative, verbally-based, evaluative, and “Why?”-type 
thinking produces detrimental consequences during focus on self, feelings and problems, relative to a 
processing mode characterized by a configuration of concrete, process-focused, imagery-based, and 
experiential processing (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Treynor et al., 2004; 
Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Taken together, these findings are consistent 
with the processing mode theory, which proposes that the consequences of depressive rumination, in part, 
depend on the particular processing mode adopted during focus on self, problems, and feelings2. 
Moreover, these findings suggest that processing mode may be an important element influencing the role 
of rumination in emotional reactivity. 
Second, the absence of any differential mood induction effect between the DR mode and A-DR 
mode across the training phase indicates that the abstract, evaluative processing mode consistent with the 
phenomenology of depressive rumination is not an inherently maladaptive form of thought. Previous 
studies have found that the maladaptive effects of depressive rumination only occur in dysphoric 
participants, such that it is the combination of ruminative processing with negative mood that seems to be 
maladaptive (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). In the 
current study we did not select dysphoric participants or induce negative mood prior to manipulating 
rumination, but rather exposed participants to a negative-mood-inducing event after inducing different 
processing configurations. Therefore, we examined the effect of a ruminative mindset in the context of a 
negative mood during the stress phase of the study but not during the training phase of the study. Thus, 
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our results are consistent with previous demonstrations that ruminative processing is only maladaptive in 
the context of dysphoric mood.  
 Third, Experiment 2 provided some tentative evidence that, relative to the no-training control 
condition, the A-DR mode has a protective effect against emotional reactivity, rather than that the DR 
mode exacerbates emotional reactivity. However, it is important to note that following failure, the 
default mode adopted in the no-training control seems to be similar to the DR mode. Thus, we don’t 
know if the A-DR mode would have a beneficial effect when compared to a more neutral non-
ruminative control condition. 
 Fourth, the differential effects of the DR and A-DR modes on emotional reactivity are 
consistent with our level-of-construal hypothesis. As noted earlier, whereas low-level construals 
involve contextualized representations, high-level construals engender generalizations, such that it is 
hypothesized that in the context of a negative event, relative to low-level construals, higher-level 
construals are likely to produce negative overgeneralizations. Such overgeneralizations are implicated 
in the onset and maintenance of depression (Beck, 1976; Carver, 1998) and exacerbate emotional 
reactivity (Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Within this account, the mechanism by which the A-DR mode 
would reduce emotional reactivity is by producing more concrete, specific mental representations that 
reduce negative overgeneralizations. Consistent with this hypothesis, inducing specific, concrete modes 
of thought results in less emotion to subsequent mood inductions, relative to inducing more general 
modes (Philippot et al., 2006; Philippot et al., 2003; Raes et al., 2006). Similarly, these results have 
implications for cognitive models highlighting attributional style in vulnerability for depression, since 
higher-level construals are consistent with the global, stable attributions for negative events that are 
implicated in the onset of depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Alloy et al., 1999). 
Thus, level-of-construal during processing is a plausible candidate for a potential mediator of the 
differential effects of the DR mode versus other modes antithetical to depressive rumination. However, 
the current experiments were not designed to examine the role of this dimension (or any other 
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dimension) as a mediator of the training effects. A design similar to that used by MacLeod et al. (2002, 
study 2), in which the response to the stressor task is examined before and after the training phase is 
necessary in order to assess potential mediators of the effects of training on reactivity. 
Finally, an unresolved question concerns whether there is a potential interaction between 
processing mode and the valence of the emotionally eliciting event, such that high-level construals 
exacerbate negative emotional responses to negative events but also exacerbate positive emotional 
responses to positive events (see Watkins, in press). Does DR mode training specifically increase 
emotional reactivity to negative events, or does training into DR mode lead to people reading more 
general implications into any emotional event relative to A-DR mode training, such that for a positive 
event, the DR mode training condition would lead to a greater increase in positive mood? Currently, the 
evidence is mixed: Relative to inducing lower-level construals, inducing higher-level construals can 
increase the positive emotional response to positive events (e.g., compliments, Marigold, Holmes, & 
Ross, 2007) or positive mood inductions (Philippot et al., 2003, 2006), although thinking about positive 
events with lower-level construals has also been associated with increased positive affect compared to 
reappraisal  (Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Dickerhoof, 2006).  
 The current studies were designed as a preliminary test of whether processing mode influences 
emotional reactivity, using an analogue of a negative event in a non-clinical sample. Despite a number of 
strengths including a robust experimental methodology and replication across three studies, there are 
several limitations. First, the failure induction was relatively mild. It is not known whether the present 
findings would generalize to more severe negative events. Second, our experimental sample was 
predominantly female, which may limit the extent to which we can generalize our findings to a male 
sample. Third, there is the question of whether the training conditions would have similar effects in 
clinical populations, such as people with major depression. All participants reported depressive symptoms 
well below clinical levels, limiting the extent we can generalize our findings to a more depressed sample. 
Because Moberly and Watkins (2006) found that similar training conditions influenced the relationship 
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between trait rumination and emotional reactivity, and trait rumination is a known vulnerability factor for 
depression, we speculate that the effects of training observed here would extend to individuals with 
clinical depression such that training in A-DR mode would reduce emotional reactivity relative to training 
in DR mode. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, the A-DR mode manipulation may be more potent for less 
dysphoric populations, whereas the DR mode manipulation may be more potent for more dysphoric 
populations. A low-dysphoria sample, such as in the current studies, may find it to harder to engage in a 
manipulation training DR mode, whereas individuals more prone to depression may be more responsive 
to the DR mode training. For these reasons, it is important that the generalizability of these findings to 
individuals with clinical depression is empirically tested.  
A fourth limitation concerns the selection of the training material used. We assumed that training 
would have the greatest likelihood of influencing emotional reactivity if the training itself was focused on 
emotional scenarios that were relevant to the subsequent negative stressor. However, we also chose to use 
a balance of positive scenarios and negative scenarios in order to minimize any overall mood induction 
effects of the training itself. One potential limitation of this design is that the use of positive training 
materials may reduce the ecological validity of the training task because naturally occurring depressive 
rumination is focused predominantly on negative events. Further, the inclusion of positive scenarios in the 
training materials may dilute the effects of the training on subsequent emotional reactivity, although this 
has the advantage of making the current studies a more conservative test of our hypothesis. One might 
argue that training would have stronger effects on emotional reactivity if the training items were 
exclusively negative scenarios and weaker effects if the training items were exclusively neutral or 
positive. Nonetheless, it remains an empirical question as to whether similar effects would be found if the 
training materials were exclusively negative, positive or neutral. 
A fifth limitation concerns the possibility that the simple measure of self-focus may conflate 
distinct forms of self-focus. Recent theories emphasize a distinction between ruminative self-focus 
motivated by threat versus reflective self-focus motivated by curiosity (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). It 
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may be that the distinct processing modes would have differential effects on these distinct forms of self-
focus that the current experiments cannot determine. 
 In conclusion, we have demonstrated that it is possible to manipulate individuals’ subsequent 
emotional reactivity by training them to adopt either a mindset characteristic of the phenomenology of 
depressive rumination or a mindset antithetical to that observed in depressive rumination. These findings 
suggest that it is not just cognitive biases towards or away from negative information that can cause 
variations in emotional reactivity, but also that the mode in which people process emotional information 
causally influences subsequent emotional reactivity.  
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Footnote 
1 There were few other significant main effects or interactions: There were no interactions of Sentence 
Target by Sentence Meaning, all Fs < 1, and only one significant main effect of Sentence Target, F(1, 18) 
= 6.30, p < .05, with the evaluation of meanings and implications as the dependent variable, reflecting 
foils being rated as less focused on meanings and implications than targets.  
2
 We note that our conceptualization of high-level versus low-level construals does parallel the subtypes 
of rumination (brooding, reflective pondering) reported by Treynor et al. (2003). First, the distinction 
between levels-of-construal reflects a theoretical model, whereas the distinction between brooding and 
reflective pondering is atheoretical and derived from a factor analysis. Second, both brooding and 
reflective pondering factors are multidimensional involving focus on self, focus on feelings, and self-
judgment as well as abstract construals. Third, both brooding and reflective pondering have been 
associated with depressive symptoms. 
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 Table 1 
Despondency Scores during Training Phase and Stress Phase in Experiment 1  
   Training Condition  
 DR modea  A-DR modeb 
Variable M SD  M SD 
Pretraining Despondency  9.50 16.05  9.00 12.52 
Posttraining Despondency  16.50 18.14  17.50 18.32 
Prestress Despondency  18.50 20.07  15.00 20.65 
Poststress Despondency  40.00 29.56  21.00 21.98 
Note. DR = mode consistent with depressive rumination; A-DR = mode antithetical to depressive 
rumination. 
a 4 male, 16 female; b6 male, 14 female
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Table 2 
Despondency Scores during Training Phase and Stress Phase in Experiment 2  
     Condition    
 DR modea  A-DR modeb  No trainingc 
Variable M SD  M SD  M SD 
Pretraining Despondency  21.19 17.17  18.09 18.54  13.24 16.80 
Posttraining Despondency  25.24 16.92  23.57 20.44  16.48 18.78 
Prestress Despondency  25.24 17.78  25.48 21.56  17.38 16.25 
Poststress Despondency  58.57 23.72  38.09 23.58  47.48 28.39 
Note. DR = mode consistent with depressive rumination; A-DR = mode antithetical to depressive 
rumination. 
a4 male, 17 female;  b6 male, 15 female; c3 male, 18 female. 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Affect Scores by Condition and Time in Experiment 3  
   Condition   
 DR mode  A-DR mode 
Variable M SD  M SD 
Pretraining Positive Affect  51.70 9.94  53.05 13.41 
Posttraining Positive Affect 46.30 14.33  45.00 16.29 
Poststress Positive Affect  35.00 14.95  40.90 18.65 
Pretraining Negative Affect  23.60 11.91  25.80 16.56 
Posttraining Negative Affect  19.05 11.34  19.65 11.85 
Poststress Negative Affect  30.65  17.11  23.20 13.13 
      
Note. DR = mode consistent with depressive rumination; A-DR = mode antithetical to depressive 
rumination. 
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Figure 1. Effect of anagram stress task on despondency after processing mode training in Experiment 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Effect of anagram stress task on negative affect after interpretative bias training in Experiment 
3. 
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